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Disentangling the Motivations for Organizational Insider Computer Abuse through the 
Rational Choice and Life Course Perspectives 
ABSTRACT 
Criminal organizational insider computer abuse (ICA) research has focused on factors that influence 
either ICA intentions, or actual behavior during the ICA process. However, this research has failed to 
correctly conceptualize the decision-making processes involved in ICA. Thus, our first aim is to 
demonstrate this current deficiency by leveraging the rational choice perspective (RCP) from 
criminology. The RCP advances an “event” stage, in which choices are made leading up to and during 
the criminal act. However, the RCP also acknowledges a preceding “initial involvement” stage, which 
encompasses those factors that lead an individual to consider participation in crime. RCP explains that 
if, during the initial involvement stage, an individual becomes motivated and decides that future 
criminal behavior is the most suitable course of action, then he or she will have reached a state of 
“readiness.” It is only after an individual has become readied, and at a later time, does the individual 
make event decisions in the perpetration of a specific crime. Consequently, extent ICA research has 
overlooked consideration of why—prior to the crime-an individual initially considers engaging in 
such criminal activity in the first instance. And, this is not to be conflated with intentions. 
Accordingly, we argue that there needs to be a clear distinction between those motivational factors 
that would lead to the consideration of such engagement at the initial involvement stage, and those 
factors that would lead an individual at the event stage to perpetrate a crime. We thus propose a 
revised version of the extended security action cycle (ESAC), which reflects these criminal decision-
making stages. Moreover, we provide a means through which to identify and understand the 
relationship among those factors that may motivate an individual during the initial involvement stage, 
by drawing on the life course perspective (LCP). With a focus on time, context, and process, the LCP 
offers a framework in which are inscribed four key principles. Through examples drawn from the 
LCP and white-collar crime literature, we illustrate how these principles can provide a basis for 
conceptualizing factors that motivate ICA and open up new avenues for future research/theory 
development.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although hackers and viruses often dominate the media headlines regarding security 
breaches, information systems (IS) security practitioners also have to deal with a range of threats from 
inside their organizations. Long before the international incidents involving Private Manning (U.S. 
military intelligence leaks to Wikileaks) and Edward Snowden (The U.S. National Security Agency 
document leaks), experts concurred that organizational insiders represent the greatest threats to IS 
security, and this assessment applies equally today (Crossler et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013). The 
threat exists because insiders require broad access to the most valuable organizational information to 
perform their jobs effectively, and they often cannot be controlled through technical means alone 
(Vance et al., 2013). Moreover, such people literally have “insider” information not available 
externally that can be tempting to use for personal gain through such avenues as insider trading, fraud, 
and selling trade secrets (Cummings et al., 2012). 
Attempts to gather accurate statistics on this pervasive insider problem are hampered by the 
fact that organizations often fail to report such crimes because they fear reputational damage, drawing 
attention to potential weaknesses, losing competitive advantage, and exposing privacy issues. 
Nonetheless, industry surveys provide some insight into the prevalence of insider computer abuse 
(ICA). The 2014 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) global report on organizational security (2014) 
documented an increase of 51% in security budgets and a 25% increase in security incidents from 
2013. Moreover, approximately 31% of security incidents likely were committed by current 
employees, 27% by former employees, 16% by current consultants or service providers, and 13% by 
former consultants or service providers. The survey makes clear that the insider threat is worsening 
over time and remains to be addressed sufficiently. Summarizing global concerns on the threat from 
insiders, chief security officer Michael A. Mason noted, “I see the insider threat looming larger in my 
windshield than in the past. . .. Our problems are more human than technological” (PwC, 2014, p. 8). 
More recently, PwC, CSO Magazine, The CERT Divisioni of the Software Engineering Institute at 
Carnegie Mellon University, and The United States Secret Service all teamed up to study 
organizational security issues. Aside from finding that approximately 23% of cybercrimes are 
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committed by organizational insiders, that these acts are exceedingly expensive and damaging, that 
76% of CEOs are more worried about cybersecurity than the year before, that security incidents in up 
28% in 2014 from 2013, that spending on cybersecurity has greatly increased, they grimly conclude 
that progress on thwarting such abuses has largely stalled (Anonymous, 2015). 
Despite the substantial threat that ICA poses to organizations and the dire extant situation that 
efforts to thwart it have floundered, the response from IS security researchers can be most positively 
described as “modest.” The few studies include (Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2004a; 
Lowry et al., 2014; Peace et al., 2003; Posey et al., 2011; Willison et al., 2016; Workman, 2007); 
whereas, scores of studies have examined noncriminal security intentions and behaviors. Appendix A 
provides a complete review of the ICA literature. Indeed, given the paucity of such studies, recent 
work has urged that greater focus be placed on the insider threat (Crossler et al., 2013; Posey et al., 
2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Mahmood et al. (2010), for example, likened the relationship 
between those responsible for enhancing security and those attempting to bypass it to the white 
hat/black hat (good guy/bad guy) distinction in Wild West movies. They noted how the IS security 
discipline has been dominated by “good guy white hat” approaches, which address issues such as 
employee compliance to IS security policies. As an alternative, they called for IS security academics 
to consider the “harder to reach black hat” subjects research. Such studies, they argued, will allow the 
development of more effective countermeasures based on better understandings of offender behavior. 
Even still, when considering “black hats” most researchers deal with external actors, such as hackers, 
and largely overlook malicious insiders who can do just as much damage or more. 
To aid our examination of the insider threat, we discuss, challenge, and improve upon the 
existing literature by developing the extended security action cycle (ESAC) framework by Willison 
and Warkentin (2013), which they adapted from Straub and Welke (1998) (see Figure 1). Willison 
and Warkentin (2013) argued for the need to examine not only intention to undertake ICA and 
deterrence of such behavior, but also phenomena that temporally precede these areas. Specifically, 
they advocated examination of the thought processes of a potential rogue member of staff as well as 
their interaction within the organizational context. Furthermore, they asserted that, in certain  
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Figure 1. Extended Security Action Cycle, Electronically Reproduced from Straub and Welke 
(1998) 
 
situations, such interactions might influence these thought processes and, consequently, influence the 
efficacy of deterrence safeguards. 
Although we agree with the need to examine behavior which precedes the deterrence 
influence, we argue that the Willison and Warkentin (2013) article and related studies have 
insufficiently conceptualized the offender decision making processes for ICA. The existing studies 
have assumed that the only decision made is regarding the crime itself, often using the intention 
construct as a proxy for actual behavior. However, this understanding of ICA runs contrary to an 
established body of criminological research, which illustrates that an offender makes a series of 
choice in the criminal decision making process (Blumstein, 1986; Blumstein et al., 1988; Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 2013; Paternoster, 1989a, 1989b). Research by Blumstein (1986) 
and Blumstein et al. (1988), for example, highlighted the decisions made in a criminal career. In this 
context, the term “career” is not referring to the earnings involved to sustain a criminal’s livelihood, 
but rather the sequence of decisions made in a period in which an offender is criminally active. Thus, 
there will be choices regarding the beginning (i.e., onset), the duration (i.e., career length) and 
cessation (i.e., the ending of criminal activities). Coupled with these decisions are choices made 
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regarding the frequency of offending, such as the number of times a criminal commits an offence. 
In a similar vein, Clarke and Cornish (1985) and Cornish and Clarke (2013) advanced their 
“rational choice perspective” (RCP) on offender decision making. RCP clarifies that criminals make 
decisions regarding what are termed involvement and event stages. Similar to Blumstein (1986) and 
Blumstein et al. (1988), the involvement stages requires offender decisions to be made regarding 
initial involvement, continuation and desistance. Moreover, the “event” stage, involves offender 
choices leading up to and during the criminal act.  
With specific relevance to the current discussion are the initial event and event stages 
advanced by Clarke and Cornish. Again, the “event” stage, involves offender choices leading up to 
and during the criminal act. Obvious parallels exist between the RCP and IS security research on ICA. 
However, the RCP also acknowledges the preceding “initial involvement” stage. RCP explains that if 
an individual becomes motivated during this stage and decides that future criminal behavior is the 
most suitable course of action, then he/she will have reached a state of “readiness.” As Clarke and 
Cornish (1985, p. 167): 
“Readiness involves rather more than receptiveness: it implies that the individual has 
actually contemplated this form of crime as a solution to his needs and decided that under the 
right circumstances he would commit the offence.” 
Consequently, it is only later, during the criminal “event” stage, that a crime will be enacted. 
Given that the “initial involvement” stage has been over-looked in IS Security research, it has 
wrongly been assumed that any motivations are solely related to the criminal act. Yet, this assumption 
denies any consideration of why an individual would initially consider engaging in criminal activity in 
the first instance and the associated motivational influences. We, therefore, argue that there needs to 
be a clear distinction between motivational factors at the “initial involvement” stage and factors that 
would lead an individual to undertake a crime at the “event” stage. 
 As the distinction between initial involvement and event decisions has not been considered in 
current IS security research, this further calls into question the accuracy and utility of the ESAC. In 
their paper, Willison and Warkentin (2013) discussed “pre-kinetic” events, which temporally occur 
prior to deterrence influences. Thus, it is argued that three “event” types—namely, (1) organizational 
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justice disgruntlement, (2) expressive motives, and (3) neutralization—influence the efficacy of 
deterrence safeguards. However, the ESAC model only considers these types in terms of the criminal 
act (i.e., the event stage). We thus argue that the model conflates aspects of the criminal decision 
making process, by including factors, that from an RCP, would be categorized as relating to the 
“event,” but also the “initial involvement” stage. For example, organizational justice disgruntlement 
from an RCP would be considered a motivational influence at the “initial involvement” stage. Our 
reasoning behind this argument is discussed in length in Section 3, in which we propose our revised 
version of the ESAC model, entitled The Two-Stage Decision-Making Process for ICA (Figure 4), 
based on the RCP.  
Aside from acknowledging motivational factors at the initial involvement stage, there is also 
the obvious need to identify and understand them. Accordingly, we propose a framework based on the 
life course perspective (LCP). LCP affords a focus on time, context, process, and a framework for 
researching criminal phenomena. LCP encompasses a series of principles that guide LCP research, 
which we propose as the basis for studying motivational factors at the initial involvement stage. 
In the remainder of this manuscript, we first provide further background information on ICA 
and the associated literature, and in doing so, we propose an improved definition of ICA. Next, we 
propose and advance our revised model of the ESAC, which is grounded in our observation that IS 
security studies on ICA have overlooked the initial involvement stage. We then address the problem 
of how to identify and understand those factors that may motivate an individual at the initial 
involvement stage. To assist in the identification and understanding of the relevant factors, we 
propose a new framework based on the LCP principles. We then describe each principle and illustrate 
how they may be applied to the information systems (IS) context. Finally, we conclude by considering 
the ICA research agenda and offer three potential avenues for future studies based on our conceptual 
work.  
2. DEFINING ICA 
In this section, we first explain ICA, using the associated literature. Generally, computer 
abuse (CA) is the deliberate and unauthorized misuse of information system assets (Posey et al., 
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2011) whether by internal or external actors (Straub, 1990). However, our focus is on internal abuse 
that is intentional and criminal. Most studies in this domain have considered ICA, internal computer 
abuse, computer abuse, and employee computer abuse to be synonymous (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009b; 
Herath & Rao, 2009; Lowry et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011); however, such terminological 
equivalence is not entirely accurate. We thus return to the literature to review the foundation of CA 
and ICA, propose an updated taxonomy for CA, and suggest a more precise definition of ICA. 
To better define ICA we return to the work of Loch et al. (1992) who proposed the IS 
Security Threat Vector Taxonomy, which was revised slightly by Willison and Warkentin (2013). We 
have updated this taxonomy to better account for the security conditions in today’s environment, and 
we use this taxonomy to define further what ICA is and is not.  
Figure 2 depicts our updated IS Security Threat Vector Taxonomy. ICA involves employees 
or organizational insiders—not consumers or students. Thus, we assert that several studies about 
various unethical or risky computer behaviors involving consumers or students do not constitute ICA, 
including piracy of software and digital media (Lowry et al., 2017; Nandedkar & Midha, 2012); 
illegal peer-to-peer file sharing (Moore & McMullan, 2004); deviant computer behavior by students 
(Rogers et al., 2006); cyberslacking outside of work (Nandedkar & Midha, 2012); cyberbullying 
outside of work (Lowry et al., 2016); compulsive and deviant social networking behavior (James et 
al., 2017); organizational-level decisions to commit ethical breaches (Wall et al., 2016); and risky 
behaviors that create susceptibilities to malware, phishing, privacy violations, and identity theft (Keith 
et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2012; Salleh et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). 
We consider ICA to involve only malicious behaviors conducted by employees or other 
insiders in an organizational context. Furthermore, ICA does not involve an external threat. External 
threats to IS include human sources (e.g., hackers, crackers, social engineers, phishers, and 
cyberterrorists) (Bachmann, 2010; Bossler & Burrus, 2011; Hansen et al., 2007; Workman, 2008) and 
nonhuman sources (e.g., natural disasters, malware). It should be noted that the issue of organizational 
insiders in undermining security has grown more complex since Loch et al. (1992) published their 
article. Organizations today pursue workers in more virtual and temporary roles; thus, contractors, 
  
 
 
Threats to IS 
security
Internal threats
External threats
Human ( Organizational Insider )
employees, contractors, consultants, board members, 
suppliers, vendors former employees, uninformed 
management, unsupportive management
Nonhuman
hardware failure, power surges, software bugs, internal 
network failure, firewall holes, lack of physical security,  
location-aware mobile computing, OS holes, USB devices, 
insecure apps, BYOD (employee devices), wearable 
computing, non-current software, lack of encryption use, 
lack of policies, lack of audits, weak monitoring, lack of 
training, flawed ISPs, loss of mobile devices
Human
hackers, crackers, cyber terrorists, state-sponsored 
espionage, cyber warfare, activists, crime syndicates, 
fraudsters, corporate espionage, malware mercenaries, 
cyberstalkers, cyberbullies
Nonhuman
natural disasters, malware, phishing, Trojan horses, key 
loggers, power failures, external network failure, botnets, 
compromised Web, virtual currencies, DOS attacks, external 
cloud computing, SPAM, adware, rootkits, insecure wireless 
networks, instant messaging, P2P apps, weak encryption 
algorithms, Internet of things, identity theft, social media, 
Twishing, ransomware, mobile malware, flawed 
development frameworks, theft of mobile devices
Passive, non-volitional noncompliance
unintentional actions, accidental data entry, forgetful 
oversights, uninformed violations, loss of mobile devices
Volitional but not malicious noncompliance
failing to log off, delayed backups, ignoring malware scans, 
weak passwords, Web surfing, cyber loafing, personal email 
Computer abuse: malicious and harmful noncompliance
access breach, data theft, fraud, embezzlement, blackmail,  
sabotage, data corruption and manipulation, faking data, 
insider trading, data leakage, purposeful malware 
introduction, internal cyberstalking, internal cyberbullying/
cyberharrassment, privacy violation, espionage for external 
entity, theft of equipment
Sources of threats Perpetrators of threats Continuum of the intent for IS policy violations
No intent
Low intent
High intent
 
Figure 2. Our Updated IS Security Threat Vector Taxonomy, Adapted from Willison and Warkentin (2013)ii 
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consultants, and outside suppliers expand and complicate the category of organizational insiders. 
Moreover, the velocity of change in organizations has increased—today’s employees are less likely to 
stay with the same organization for as long as employees of the past did—making former employees a 
greater threat. 
We next leverage the taxonomy by Loch et al. (1992) for guidance as to when such internal 
threats are ICA. The key here is the intent of the IS policy violations. The taxonomy groups intent into 
threat categories: (1) passive, non-volitional noncompliance (e.g., accidental behaviors, uninformed 
violations, unintentional actions); (2) volitional but not malicious noncompliance (e.g., failing to 
backup data, not changing passwords regularly, not signing out of the system, security lapses) (Guo et 
al., 2011; Jenkins et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2008); and (3) internal, malicious and criminal 
computer abuse by employees or other insiders (e.g., sabotage, data theft, fraud, and deliberate policy 
violations but only those that are criminal) (e.g., Hu et al., 2011). We consider only this latter category 
ICA. For the second category, we also add newer behaviors, such as non-work related computing and 
cyberloafing that violates IS policies but are devoid of malicious deviant intent (e.g., surfing, personal 
email, shopping) (Lee et al., 2004b; Moody & Siponen, 2013).  
We supplement the third category with newer phenomena that increasingly vex organizations. 
These criminal ICA behaviors include purposeful sharing or leaking of confidential organizational 
information or trade secrets (Smith et al., 2012); contravention of organizational security measures, 
including insider social engineering (Workman, 2007); and unauthorized data access or intentional 
access policy violations that are criminal (Hu et al., 2011). Moreover, employees are increasingly 
turning to social media at work, or using work resources, to commit newer criminal acts such as 
sexting, cyberbullying, cyberharassment, and the like—all of which has increased exposure and 
liability to organizations that need to be addressed and thwarted (Lowry et al., 2016). Aside from the 
obvious organizational issues that employee cyberbullying has caused, such as between employees, it 
turns out that organizations are also being held legally liable for the emotional and psychological 
damage that their employees inflict on those outside their organization, when such harassment is 
conducted using organizational resources, regardless of where it is done (Lowry et al., 2016).  
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Given our review of the CA and ICA literature, and the important distinctions between 
criminal and non-criminal security violations, we thus define ICA formally as follows: 
“Intentional employee or other-insider behavior involving an organization’s information 
assets or computing infrastructure that includes purposeful, deviant, and malicious intent 
against the best interests of an organization or its members, and which behavior is formally 
considered illegal.”  
Given this enhanced definition of ICA, it should be clear that not all violations of an organization’s IS 
security (IS policies) constitute ICA. For example, suppose an organization’s IS policies state that 
employees must take care to run anti-malware on all email attachments. If an employee does not run 
anti-malware software on an email because he or she is in a hurry, this action is not considered ICA 
because there was no malicious intent and there is no criminal violation. However, if an employee 
was to forward a virus to a co-worker intentionally as an act of bullying or sabotage, such an act 
constitutes ICA. 
3. THE COMPUTER ABUSE TIME LINE REVISITED 
Given our review and improved definition of ICA, we now revisit and propose revisions to 
the computer abuse time line from the ESAC framework by Willison and Warkentin (2013), as they 
adapted it from Straub and Welke (1998) (see Figure 1). Willison and Warkentin considered three 
types of “pre-kinetic” events: (1) organizational justice disgruntlement, (2) expressive motives and (3) 
neutralization. They argued that these three types of events impact the efficacy of deterrence 
safeguards. However, the ESAC model only considers these three types in terms of the criminal act 
(i.e., during the “event” stage). Accordingly a fundamental flaw of the Willison and Warkentin model 
is that it conflates aspects of the criminal decision making process that from an RCP would be 
considered to be related to the event stage, but also the initial involvement stage. For example, 
organizational justice disgruntlement would be considered a motivational influence at the initial 
involvement stage, from an RCP. It is for this reasons that we propose key time line changes for 
implementation, including T-3 and what precedes this point in time.  
As noted, we based the aforementioned changes to the ESAC time line on the criminological 
research of Clarke and Cornish, who emphasized that (1985, p. 164):  
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“There is a fundamental distinction to be made between explaining the involvement of 
particular individuals in crime and explaining the occurrence of criminal events.”  
Thus, Clarke and Cornish distinguished between involvement and event decisions. Involvement 
decisions relate to the three stages of a criminal career: An individual must make decisions about 
embarking on criminal activities (i.e., initial involvement), whether to continue these activities over 
time (i.e., continuation), and when, if at all, to cease offending (i.e., desistance). Event decisions refer 
to those decisions made during the commission of a crime.  
Importantly, Clarke and Cornish (1985) depicted these decision stages in a series of models, 
using the crime of burglary in a middle-class suburb as an illustrative example. These models were, 
thus, viewed by Clarke and Cornish as potential “blueprints” for theory development by other 
researchers. Indeed, recognizing that the configuration of such models would differ according to the 
type of crime under consideration, they simply viewed these models as “good enough” for the early 
stages of theory formulation. It is in this spirit that we draw on the work of Clark and Cornish in our 
manuscript.  
 Of specific relevance to our essay is the initial involvement model (see Figure 3). The model 
depicts the two key decision points: boxes seven (readiness) and eight (decision to commit a crime). 
As the model indicates, if an individual becomes motivated and decides that future criminal actions 
are the best way to satisfy his or her needs (box 3), then the individual will have reached a state of 
readiness (box 7).  
This readiness implies that an individual has evaluated solutions (box 4) to these needs and 
identified the best course of action (box 5). Such appraisals are further influenced by an individual’s 
moral code, self-perception, and experience of crime as well as the extent to which he or she can plan 
and employ foresight (box 2). Related to these influences are what Clarke and Cornish called 
“background factors” (box 1), which customarily have formed the focus for criminological 
dispositional theories of criminality. Such theories provide accounts of how and why individuals—
through the assimilation of specific social or psychological influences or the inheritance of traits—are 
more inclined to commit delinquent or criminal acts. It is only after an individual has become  
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1. Background factors
Psychological: Temperament, 
intelligence, cognitive style
Upbringing: broken home, institutional 
care, parental crime
Social and demographic: gender, 
class, education, neighborhood
2. Previous experience and learning
 Direct and vicarious experience of 
crime
 Contact with law enforcement 
agencies
 Conscience and moral attitudes
 Self perception
 Foresight and planning
3. Generalized needs
Money, sex, friendship, status, 
excitement, survival
7. Readiness
To commit burglary in a suburb
5. Perceived solution
Legitimate: work, gambling 
marriage, investment
Illegitimate: burglary in 
suburb, other burglary, other 
crime, embezzlement
8. Decision
To commit burglary in a suburb
4. Solutions evaluated
 Degree of effort
 Amount and immediacy of reward
 Likelihood and severity of 
punishment
 Moral costs
6. Reaction to chance event
Easy opportunity, urgent need for cash, 
persuasion by friends, gets drunk, 
argues with Spouse, late at night
 
Figure 3. The Initial Criminal Involvement Model, adapted from Clarke and Cornish (1985) 
 
 
“readied” that the individual will later decide to undertake a specific crime (box 8), which will be 
influenced by chance events (box 6).  
Importantly, the decision to commit a specific crime (box 8) relates to the event stage of the 
criminal decision-making process, which Clarke and Cornish depicted as a separate diagram. The 
event stage involves decisions and behavior regarding the actual criminal act.  
Based on the distinction between the initial involvement and the event stage in offender 
decision making, we now introduce our revised version of the ESAC (Figure 4). We call this revision 
the Two-Stage Decision-Making Process for ICA. Importantly, Figure 4 reflects the distinction  
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T1T0T-1T-2
Stage 2: ICA event stageStage 1: Initial involvement stage
T-3T-7 T-6 T-5 T-4
 
Figure 4. The Two-Stage Decision-Making Process for ICA 
 
between initial involvement and what we have termed the ICA event stage. Regarding the latter, and 
working backwards, T1 represents undetected abuse. T0 represents the moment when an insider 
commits actual ICA. Studies that have examined behavioral commission of ICA are uncommon, but a 
few do exist (Lee et al., 2004a; Lowry et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011; Workman, 2007). T-1 involves 
attempts to avert ICA, known as prevention. Technical approaches to preventing ICA include system 
and network monitoring, passwords, authentication, and facility control. Few behavioral studies have 
addressed prevention approaches, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Willison, 2006;  Willison & 
Backhouse, 2006; Willison & Siponen, 2009). T-2 addresses behavioral intentions to commit ICA, and 
T-3 addresses actions to deter negative intentions from forming; such actions are known as deterrence. 
Some studies have researched the interplay between T-2 behavioral intentions and T-3 deterrence 
actions (Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2011; Peace et al., 2003). 
Given this discussion, the point at which the individual reaches a state of readiness precedes 
event deterrence (T-4). However, the state of readiness (T-4) is reached only if an individual decides 
that crime is the most suitable course of action, as opposed to the individual’s needs being met 
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through legitimate, non-criminal activities (T-5). The individual must be driven to the point that he or 
she decides illegitimate activities are the best course of action. To be in a state to make such a 
decision, an individual must have developed motivations/needs (T-6), which further emerges because 
of the interactions represented by T-7: An employee’s interaction between work and family life, 
influenced by situational/transitory factors and current life circumstances. The reasons for this specific 
wording representing T-7 and how it leads an individual to T-6 are discussed in the following two 
sections of this manuscript. 
4. WHICH FACTORS MOTIVATE INDIVIDUALS TO A STATE OF READINESS 
FOR ICA? 
Given the crucial distinction between the initial involvement and event stages, it is 
fundamental that IS security research should consider the specific factors that motivate individuals at 
the initial involvement stage of ICA (see T-7 and T-6 per Figure 4). In the field of criminology, 
dispositional theories traditionally have been advanced to explain initial involvement in crime, as 
Clarke and Cornish (1985) acknowledge (see Figure 3). These theories describe a number of what 
they term background factors (see box 1 in Figure 3). Developed to explain how delinquents and 
other street criminals first choose to participate in crime, dispositional theories provide accounts of 
how and why individuals are more inclined to engage in acts of a delinquent or criminal nature 
(Agnew, 1992; Cloward & Ohlin, 2013; Hirschi, 2002). These inclinations towards crime emerge 
through the assimilation of specific social factors (e.g., poor housing, low-quality education, single 
parents); psychological influences (e.g., mental illness); or the inheritance of traits (e.g., low self-
control). However, Clarke and Cornish also noted that the extent to which these background factors 
are influential—and therefore the extent to which dispositional theories can help to explain initial 
involvement—depends on the type of crime. Notably, they provided the example of computer fraud as 
a case in point, arguing that background factors may be much less influential than the individual’s 
immediate situation (Clarke & Cornish, 1985, p. 167):  
“The contribution of background factors to the final decision to commit crime would be much 
moderated by situational and transitory influences: and for certain sorts of crime (e.g., 
computer fraud), the individual’s background might be of much less relevance than his 
RESEARCH ESSAY: Disentangling insider computer abuse 
16 
 
immediate situation.”  
The influence of situational and transitory factors on the motivations of individuals is also 
consistent with white-collar crime research. Unlike delinquent behavior, in which initial involvement 
in crime occurs early in life or during but not after adolescence (Blumstein, 1986; Piquero & Benson, 
2004b), the initial involvement for white-collar criminals generally occurs much later in life. Indeed, 
studies by Benson and Kerley (2000) and Weisburd and Waring (2001) found the average age at 
initial involvement for white-collar criminals to be around 40 years old. In an attempt to provide an 
explanation for this interesting phenomenon, Piquero and Benson (2004b), drew on the findings of 
existing research (Weisburd, 1991; Weisburd & Waring, 2001; Wheeler et al., 1988) and noted the 
role of situational influences. Specifically, they highlighted the potential of a crisis in an individual’s 
personal or occupational life that could influence the involvement in offending. This position is 
supported by earlier white-collar crime research, which emphasized a focus on the current life 
experiences of individuals for understanding motivational factors. Benson and Kerley (2000, p. 133) 
clarified these points, as follows:  
“One searches in vain for early precursors or early hints of trouble in the life-history of the 
typical white-collar offender. For most of these individuals, their offences appear to come out 
of nowhere. Their crimes do not appear to be part of longstanding patterns of anti-social 
conduct, nor do they appear to be deeply rooted in a troubled social background … White 
collar crime appears to be more a function of adult life experiences as opposed to latent 
personality traits or a disturbed social background.”  
These observations are mirrored in an ever-increasing body of ICA research undertaken by 
the U.S. Secret Service together with the CERT Division based at Carnegie Mellon University. This 
research does not emphasize troubled histories of offenders or broken homes but rather focuses on 
current and situationally specific triggers that lead employees into crime. These groups have 
conducted a series of studies that highlight how an employee’s relationship with his or her 
organization can often provoke ICA. For example, a 2005 CERT report studied 49 cases of insider 
sabotage, and in 88% of the cases, the perpetrator held a work-related grievance (Keeney et al., 2005). 
In addition, various CERT reports have indicated how problems in one sphere of a person’s life could 
influence another. In a report involving the banking and finance sector, for example, the CERT 
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Division examined 23 ICA cases and found that in 27% of them, individuals were experiencing 
financial difficulties in their personal lives (Cappelli et al., 2004). Cappelli et al. (2012) offered 
additional examples, highlighting the role of internal stressors (e.g., the threat of layoffs, 
disagreements over salary) and external stressors (e.g., family member with health problems, personal 
debt) in motivating ICA.  
Further evidence has also pointed to “transitory” forces, as noted by Clarke and Cornish 
(1985), and the need to consider how work/social life domains interact within the context of macro 
socio-economic forces. Transitory economic recessions can place financial pressures on families and 
businesses alike. For example, results from a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey indicated that levels of 
ICA may reflect the current economic climate (PwC, 2012). Specifically, it emphasized that 
organizational data may be more at risk because of company lay-offs. When the same survey was 
conducted in 2009, 34% of European respondents believed that risks to company data had increased 
as a consequence of job losses. By 2011, this figure had risen to 42%. These figures are also echoed in 
a report by Ernst & Young (2010), in which findings from a survey undertaken in 2009, a year after 
the emergence of the worldwide credit crunch, revealed that 25% of respondents had witnessed an 
increased in ICA.  
Again, for street criminals, dispositional theories have been developed for explaining their 
initial involvement in crime. Such theories advance various causes, which are summarized by Clarke 
and Cornish (1985) as background factors (see Figure 3, box 1). However, Clarke and Cornish also 
noted that for certain types of crime, including what they termed “computer fraud,” these background 
factors may have far less influence when compared with an individual’s immediate situation. Indeed, 
this section, has illustrated how situational and transitory forces can be seen to originate from the 
related personal and occupational spheres which can be further influenced by macro socio-economic 
forces. This points to a considerably more complex picture of the potential motivations for ICA than 
has previously been considered in the IS security research. This then begs the question as to how such 
factors should be identified and understood? The next section outlines such an approach. 
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5. CONSIDERING THE INITIAL INVOLVEMENT FOR ICA THROUGH THE LCP 
Here, we propose the application of the LCP (Elder, 1994, 1998) to clarify the ICA 
motivational influences (located in box 1 of Figure 3; see also T-7 and T-6 per Figure 4) at the initial 
involvement stage. The LCP has its origins in sociology but has extended its reach to other 
disciplines, including social history (Modell, 1989), developmental psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 
1979), and gerontology (Streib & Binstock, 1990). The LCP represents a substantial change in the 
study of people and their lives. Central to this examination is a focus on time, context, and process. 
LCP traditionally has considered three trajectories in individuals’ lives: their education, work, and 
family. LCP research has studied the interdependency of these trajectories while considering how 
development in these trajectories is affected by historical/socio-economic forces and short-term 
transitions. These transitions (or “events”) can include factors such as commencing university studies, 
changing jobs, becoming unemployed, getting married, having a child, getting divorced, and 
experiencing bereavement from death of a loved one. 
Crucially, LCP is not a theory, but rather a perspective that can help conceptualize and study 
phenomena. Thus, Elder (1998) noted that the life course “defines a common field of inquiry by 
providing a framework that guides research on matters of problem identification and conceptual 
development” (p. 4). As depicted in Figure 5, four key principles form the framework advanced by 
Giele and Elder (1998): (1) time and place, (2) timing, (3) linked lives, and (4) human agency. We 
advance this framework as the basis for providing insights into the contemporary, transitory, and 
situational factors that motivate an individual to initial involvement in criminal behavior. We note 
how the relationship among the three trajectories of education, work, and family and contemporary, 
transitory, and situational factors can lead an individual into a fourth trajectory—crime. 
Next, we discuss each of the four principles and provide illustrations of their applications in 
LCP research. Given the absence of IS security research focusing on the factors that influence initial 
involvement in ICA, we also draw on white-collar crime research as a means to illustrate how the 
framework could be applied to the IS security field. One major advantage of applying the LCP 
framework to IS security research is that it provides a lens through which to conceptualize influential 
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Figure 5. Four Key Principles in the LCP Framework, adapted from Giele and Elder (1998) 
 
factors and understand the relationships amongst them, just as applied to white-collar crime. 
We justify the use of the white-collar crime literature by arguing that the line between white-
collar crime and ICA is increasingly blurred. This blurring is due to the proliferation of computers and 
their use by white-collar employees. A similar argument is provided by Weisburd and Waring (2001, 
p. 11) who note: 
“[C]hanges in our society … have placed the opportunity for white-collar crimes in the hands 
of a much broader class of Americans, most of them who were excluded from these activities 
in the past. In part, the rapid growth of white-collar jobs in America in the last fifty years had 
spawned such changes (Bell, 1973). But perhaps even more important are the dramatic 
differences in the way modern society functions. The advent of the computer, for example, 
gives large numbers of people access to the documents and transactions that are so much a 
part of white-collar illegalities.” 
5.1 Principal One: Time and Place 
The principle of time and place states that “the life course of individuals is embedded in and 
shaped by the historical times and places they experience over their lifetime” (Elder, 1998, p. 3). 
Differences in when individuals are born exposes them to varied historical worlds. These worlds offer 
both constraints and opportunities, which are reflected in the individuals’ lives. The influences of 
specific historical times and places on people take the form of a cohort effect, in which successive 
cohorts reflect the historical epochs through which they live. An example of this principle is provided 
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by Zhou and Hou (1999), who studied the effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) on 
Chinese youth. During this period, a large number of Chinese youths experienced being “sent down,” 
a process that involved separation from their families and communities and being forced to undertake 
manual labor. Such an experience had a profound effect on the life course of these youths and 
differentiated this specific cohort from successive groups that did not experience the same fate. 
The principal of time and place provides insight into how influential factors may emerge 
depending on the historical epoch. This principle has been illustrated in recent years with that 
widespread organizational lay-offs, resulting from the recent global downturn. The influence of macro 
socio-economic forces also has been discussed in a series of white-collar crime studies (Benson & 
Moore, 1992; Wheeler, 1992). Indeed, Benson and Moore (1992) argued that during economic 
prosperity, an ever-present opportunity for an employee to embezzle may remain just that—an 
opportunity. However, a recession may influence the employee to consider crime to make ends meet. 
For example, his or her partner may become unemployed, forcing a reinterpretation of the opportunity 
and the enactment of embezzlement. Accordingly, Benson and Moore concluded that any theory of 
white-collar crime must consider macro socio-economic forces due to their potential to influence 
initial involvement in crime.  
5.2 Principle Two: Timing 
The second principle of timing states that “the developmental impact of a succession of life 
transitions or events is contingent on when they occur in a person’s life” (Elder, 1987, p. 3). The study 
by Elder (1987) of men from Oakland, California, who were mobilized to fight in World War II, 
provides an illustration of this principle. The study found that the effect of mobilization depended on 
the men’s life stage. For instance, early entrants—those who entered the military before they were 21 
years old—experienced little disruption in their life course. Of this group, few were married or in a 
steady relationship when mobilized. For late entrants—those who entered the military at ages 22 or 
older—the picture was far different. These men were three times as likely to be living with a wife 
compared with the early entrants. Late army entrants also experienced greater disruption regarding 
work. Many of these men already had established a career prior to being called up, which was not the 
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case for early entrants. Indeed, many of the early entrants used the opportunities offered by the G.I. 
Bill, post-war, to enter college and then establish a career.  
In the organizational domain, the principle of timing can be illustrated by examining the 
relationship between threats to an employee’s job security (Kinnunen et al., 1999; Sverke & Hellgren, 
2002) and the employee’s life stage. As time passes, an employee’s identity may change to that of 
breadwinner (Thébaud, 2010; Warren, 2007). A breadwinner is likely to accrue additional financial 
responsibilities in the form of a mortgage, new car, child care, and schooling fees. In her study of ICT 
workers, Kelan (2008) noted how the extra financial burden breadwinners experience led to them to 
place a greater emphasis on job security. However, job security was not such a priority for unmarried 
individuals who had no children and, therefore, fewer financial responsibilities. Parallels can be 
drawn here with the work of Charles and James (2003), who studied the relationship between job 
insecurity and work orientations for men and women. Based on interviews with staff from three 
different employment sectors (manufacturing, public, retail), they noted that the significance of paid 
work for each respondent affected their attitudes towards job security. Highlighting the importance of 
employment stability, for example, one respondent stated the following (p. 252): 
“When I was single, when I first started here I was single, it didn’t matter to me if this place 
closed or not. Because I had no dependents. I didn’t have to— there was just myself I was 
taking care of. And when you get married and you get a house and you have got a mortgage 
and a couple of kids come along—that’s the difference.” 
This research illustrated that employees react differently to a firm’s financial problems and 
the ensuing threats to job security. Notably, these reactions depend on their life stages and their 
marital/familial responsibilities. In extreme cases, in a bid to ensure the family’s financial stability, a 
breadwinner may resort to ICA. Supporting evidence for this assertion comes from studies in which 
convicted white-collar offenders were interviewed about the motives for their offenses (Klenowski et 
al., 2011; Willot et al., 2001). In the study by Willot et al. (2001), for example, four offenders 
described as upper-middle class discussed not only their own financial responsibilities, but also those 
of the employees who worked for them. This factor is illustrated in the following excerpt from an 
offenders’ group discussion (p. 450): 
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Francis: If it had just been me, I don’t think … there would probably have been no need, to, 
to have to dig into these funds because … 
Lawrence: I agree, if I was a single person, I would just have walked away, it wouldn’t have 
concerned one. 
Rupert: Yeah, I think that is a strong factor, because although my family’s grown up now, at 
the time this happened, I had a young family. Then you look to your staff, who in turn have 
got their responsibilities and young families themselves. 
5.3 Principle Three: Linked Lives 
The third principle of linked lives asserts that “lives are lived interdependently, and social and 
historical influences are expressed through this network of shared relationships” (Elder, 1998, p. 4). 
Of some significance, these shared relationships are not trajectory specific but rather cross the 
boundaries of education, work, and family life. The fact that these relationships are not trajectory 
specific enables consideration of how these areas of life can influence each other. Drawing on this 
principle, Bailey et al. (2004) conducted a grounded theory study which explored how dual-earner 
households make decisions about migration with respect to home and work tasks. Specifically, in 
terms of home tasks, they looked at how couples manage their caring responsibilities for their own 
children and elderly parents. Bailey et al. noted the following (p. 1628): 
“What emerges, then, is the view that (im)mobility is influenced by how household networks 
trigger, enable and constrain migration, and that the strength of these networks over space 
and time affects the balance of enabling and constraining factors. When local linkages are 
not strong, families move to be near parents, even if this requires adjustments to employment 
careers. However, when local linkages are strong, elderly parents are moved to be near their 
children.” 
The breadwinner example also helps to demonstrate the principle of linked-lives in that the 
LCP affords consideration of how the spheres of work and personal life may influence each other. 
With the case of the breadwinner, it is clear how changes in an employee’s personal life may affect 
decisions in the work environment. Wheeler (1992) provides another example, noting how white-
collar criminals are not always driven by the desire for more; rather, they often seek simply to 
maintain what they have. Speculating in a previous study, Weisburd (1991, p. 189) noted, … 
“[certain potential offenders] would be reasonably happy with the place they have achieved 
through conventional means if only they could keep that place. But the fate of organizational 
success and failure, or the changing nature of the economy in their line of work may put them 
at least temporarily under great financial pressure, where they risk losing the lifestyle that 
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they have achieved. They may perceive this situation as a short-term threat that can be met 
through short-term fraud—a temporary taking to be restored as soon as their business 
fortunes turn around. The motivation for their crime is not selfish ego gratification, but rather 
the fear of falling—of losing what they have worked so hard to gain.” 
Wheeler’s argument is supported by a number of self-report studies, which have found that 
the motive for white-collar crime is sometimes the desire to maintain what has been achieved through 
hard work as opposed to greed and the desire for more (Benson, 1985; Denzin, 1977). Rothman and 
Gandossy (1982), for instance, provided an example of a man who co-owned a building business with 
his brothers. He preferring to leave the bookkeeping to his siblings; then one day they informed him 
that it had been essential to commit white-collar crime offenses to keep their company afloat. 
Although shocked and angered by the news, the man did not report his brothers’ actions. Rather, 
concerned about the economic welfare of his family, he decided that complicity was the best course of 
action.  
5.4 Principle Four: Human Agency 
The fourth and final LCP principle is that of human agency. This principle states that 
“individuals construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take within the 
opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstances” (Elder, 1998, p. 4). Gong et al. 
(2011) examined this principle in terms of how human agency can influence the relationship between 
migration and mental health. Specifically, they studied human agency in terms of the reasons for 
migration, the extent to which the migration was planned, and whether the migration was voluntary or 
involuntary (e.g., a refugee fleeing from war and seeking political asylum). Of particular interest to 
the researchers was the extent to which the exercise of human agency before migration influenced the 
mental well-being of the migrants once they had moved and were attempting to adapt to their new 
country of residence. Using a sample of Asian immigrants who migrated to the US between 2002 and 
2003, the study produced two major findings. First, individuals who had a number of strong reasons to 
move were less likely to experience mental health problems compared with those who lacked a clear 
rationale. Secondly, there were psychological benefits for those who carefully planned their 
migration. Gong et al. (2011) argued that planning—the accumulation of financial resources, 
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acquiring language training, and establishing new social networks—lessened the distress of the move 
and reduced the likelihood of mental disorders. 
The principle of human agency appears well suited to a discussion of white-collar crime in 
which offenders and potential offenders are considered rational decision makers (Benson & Cullen, 
1988; Weisburd et al., 1995). In addition, white-collar crime research has noted how social 
circumstances are influenced by historical socio-economic forces; that is, such influences may be 
present in one period but not in others. As discussed, Benson and Moore (1992) argued that any 
theory of white-collar crime must consider macro social and economic forces due to their influence on 
the decision-making process of offenders. They asserted that when an economy is buoyant, an 
employee may be aware of an ever-present embezzlement opportunity, but it may remain simply a 
notion or passing temptation. However, a recession could influence the employee’s firm negatively, 
threatening the employee’s job security and forcing him or her to reconsider the embezzlement 
opportunity.  
Aside from the arguments made by Benson and Moore (1992), several other studies of 
offender accounts have highlighted the influence of historical and social circumstances and their 
influence on the decision making of white-collar criminals (e.g., Benson, 1985; Klenowski et al., 
2011; Rothman & Gandossy, 1982). In keeping with our discussion of breadwinning (see Principle 
Two: Timing), Klenowski et al. (2011) studied the accounts of men and women who were convicted 
of white collar offenses. One offender, named Xavier, made the following argument (p. 55): 
“I guess when I was committing my acts, I believed that maybe I was doing some of this for 
my family. I wanted to have the time and the financial security to be around my family to 
make sure that I would be there for my children, so I guess family also subconsciously played 
into why I did what I did. It all boils down to power and greed and decisions you make in life; 
in my case, my family was part of my decision making for why I did what I did.” 
6. THE FUTURE OF ICA RESEARCH 
Although ICA remains a major threat for businesses, as noted, the response from IS security 
researchers has been relatively modest. Nonetheless, recent IS security research has urged a greater 
focus on the insider threat (Crossler et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013; Warkentin 
& Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), the vast bulk of this research is focused on policy 
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noncompliance with noncriminal violations (e.g., Barlow et al., 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 
2013; D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Guo & Yuan, 2012; Guo et al., 2011; Hsu et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 
2015; Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance et al., 2015). Although noncriminal 
behaviors are indeed important to study, criminal behaviors can be particularly damaging to 
organizations and thus need greater focus in the literature. In a bid to address the need for more and 
better ICA research, this paper encompasses two aims: to demonstrate a gap in the IS security 
research, via the RCP, and to introduce the LCP for studying the motivations for ICA. First, it is clear 
the research has focused almost solely on factors influencing an individual’s decision regarding 
intentions for ICA. However, such research has overlooked another key stage in the criminal decision-
making process: Through the application of the RCP, we illustrate how existing research on ICA has 
failed to consider those motivational factors that could lead to initial involvement and a state of 
readiness. This omission has led us to advance a revised version of the ESAC we call the Two-Stage 
Decision Making Process for ICA. Second, we aim to advance and demonstrate the application of a 
framework based on the LCP, which can assist researchers in identifying these motivational factors at 
the initial involvement stage.  
As can be seen through a discussion of the four LCP principles, this approach enables a 
dynamic perspective for considering the motivations that influence the decision to participate in 
criminal behavior. First, regarding the principle of time and place, the perspective affords insight into 
how influential factors may emerge depending on the historical epoch. Second, the principle of timing 
helps to examine how a specific event may affect individuals differently, depending on their life stage. 
Third, the principle of linked-lives fosters consideration of how the spheres of work and personal life 
may influence each other. Fourth, the principal of human agency encourages understanding of how 
individuals’ life courses are constructed as they make choices about criminal behavior. These choices 
reflect the current realities and opportunities of historical and social circumstances. 
Embracing and integrating the RCP and LCP into IS security research should not only cause a 
major shift in the theoretical lens that focuses on ICA, but also open up previously hidden avenues of 
compelling research. We thus conclude by offering further thoughts on what these perspectives should 
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mean for future research. We first argue that the concepts we have introduced in this essay cannot be 
waved off as mere covariates of ICA. Next, based on our discussion of the white-collar crime 
literature in relation to the LCP, we also offer a possible alternative to deterrence theory when 
considering offender decision making. 
6.1 The LCP Requires More Than Mere Covariates 
Given the extant trend in IS security research to focus on intentions to commit ICA and to 
address counter-explanations as covariates, we warn against treating the concepts we have introduced 
as mere covariates. For example, modelling intentions to commit ICA with demographics of marital 
status, organization’s economic status, and personal financial pressure, does not properly use the LCP. 
Such factors first need to be explained first in terms of offender readiness, which is a key missing 
construct in the IS literature that temporally precedes intentions and has unique antecedents; crucially, 
readiness is not a covariate of intentions. Although hints of these interrelationships can be found in the 
literature, only the LCP can provide an understanding of how they are related and why. Notably, most 
current IS security models are cross-sectional in nature and do not consider temporal influences, let 
alone the crucial missing link of readiness and the life events that encourage readiness. Some may 
argue that focusing only on intention with its covariates provides theoretical concision; however, we 
argue that such “concision” misrepresents the reality of ICA. Thus, new models are needed that 
consider temporal influence of the events leading up to actual ICA.  
Complementary to these models, ICA researchers need to expand their methodological and 
measurement repertoire to study these phenomena. The current common practice of using one-off 
surveys or hypothetical vignettes are likely to come up short in effectively studying our two-stage 
event-based model. We thus believe it is crucial that ICA researchers turn to longitudinal data 
collections or our proposed timeline of events cannot be properly studied or measured in a causal 
manner. To do so, ICA researchers will likely need to follow truly longitudinal event studies 
conducted in Sociology and in Criminology, which often take place over years, not months. In doing 
so, greater care needs to be taken for triangulating measurement with actual events rather than solely 
relying on participating self-report. Such studies would definitely need to involve participants (i.e., 
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employees) responding to questions about life events and their ICA behaviors, but for improved data, 
manager reports on the employees’ behaviors would also be needed. 
Another promising avenue of research would be to better leverage big-data analytics methods 
to better understand life events and organizational events that might act as triggers that foster 
motivations and readiness to commit ICA. Although there would be ethical concerns with such 
research and practice that would need to be carefully addressed, organizations have already legal used 
predictive analytics on their employees to predict factors such as who is most likely to leave their 
employment prematurely. Organizations would not be privy to all key life events that could trigger 
ICA, but they are legally privy to some that could be studied in a consistent, predictive manner (e.g., 
change in marital status, surviving a round of layoffs in a department, credit score changes, change in 
number of family dependents, poor work reviews). 
6.2 Advancing RCP and LCP for understanding offender decision making at the event stage. 
Here, we urge IS security researchers to look beyond intentions and consider the decision 
making and actual behaviors involved in the perpetration of ICA. As noted, intention is often used a 
proxy for behavior, but we argue that this leads to misplaced assumptions about the ICA commission 
process, which belie its complexity. Although we have concentrated on the motivations for ICA at the 
“initial involvement” stage, we also propose that the LCP and RCP can provide much needed clarity 
in terms of what to research at the “event” stage by examining opportunities for ICA. We discuss 
these next. 
In discussing white-collar crimes, Piquero and Benson (2004a) argued that offences may be 
“situationally dependent” on two levels. First, and consistent with our arguments, they noted that an 
individual may experience a crisis in their work or personal life that motivates the commission of a 
white-collar crime (e.g., financial strain due to bankruptcy or divorce). However, they also noted that 
white collar-offending may be situationally dependent in the sense that the opportunity to offend may 
not come about until they have secured a certain occupational position. They emphasized that, unlike 
street offenders, the opportunities for white-collar criminals, are not ubiquitous or so democratically 
distributed. Rather, access to opportunities are shaped by the occupational position undertaken by an 
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employee and the structure of the organization in which an employee works.  
As illustration, an accountant may perceive an opportunity for embezzlement, which can be 
executed through the use of his/her company’s online book-keeping system. Due to his/her access to 
and knowledge of the book-keeping system, which arose from the nature of his/her position, the 
accountant may perceive an embezzlement opportunity; yet, it is unlikely that a marketing employee 
from the same company would equally view the booking-keeping system as offering them an 
opportunity for embezzlement. Given his/her different position, the marketing employee would likely 
not have access to the company accounts or know how to use the online book-keeping software. In 
this sense, organizations play an important role in shaping what is termed the opportunity structure — 
that is, how a specific context may offer/deny opportunities, depending on the individual. 
When considering these two aspects of situational dependency in terms of the LCP, the latter 
may also help to explain why white-collar and ICA offenders commit their offences at a later stage of 
their life course, when compared with juvenile delinquents or street offenders. A key point is that the 
LCP affords consideration of the inter-play between trajectories and how events in one may have 
implications for another and lead to the “initial involvement” in crime. Previously law abiding 
individuals who have assimilated the trappings and behaviors of the middle-class may be following 
conventional trajectories in their work and family life. Many such individuals may have academic 
degrees and worked hard to attain their occupational positions. Achieving these goals takes time and 
represent periods of conformity to general society. Yet a crisis in their work or family life, may lead 
them to consider crime as a solution to their newly developed needs. Given the previous conventional 
course of the trajectories followed by such individuals, this leads them to resorting to crime at a much 
later stage in their life, when compared with juvenile delinquents, who will commence criminal 
activities in their teenage years. Therefore, without consideration of the inter-play between the 
different life course trajectories, it is difficult to conceptualize the factors which lead to the “initial 
involvement” and later the perpetration of white-collar/ICA offenses in the “event” stage.  
The manner in which the environment shapes potential opportunities is also consistent with 
the RCP. Regarding their “initial involvement” model, Clarke and Cornish argued that if an offender 
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decides that criminal actions are the best means through which to satisfy their needs, then they will 
have reached a state of “readiness.” Therefore, it is only after an individual has reached this state, that, 
at a later date, they will select an opportunity and perpetrate a specific crime in the “event” stage. 
Such opportunities will be selected based on the associated costs and benefits. Notably, the RCP 
adopts a crime-specific approach for understanding why certain opportunities are acted on and not 
others. To help elucidate the factors that an offender considers when undertaking this cost-benefit 
analysis, Cornish and Clarke (1987) advanced the concept of “choice-structuring” properties. Such 
properties relate to not only the offense, but also the offender. Therefore, in terms of specific offenses, 
factors can include the type of crime, type and amount of “payoff,” perceived risk, skills required, and 
so on. These in turn will be considered by the offender regarding their own goals, motives, 
experiences, abilities, expertise and preferences. Given the nature of the relationship between offense 
and offender, choice structuring properties helps to explain the basis on which opportunities are 
selected and why certain offenses will be differentially attractive to some offenders and not others. 
There is a notable overlap here with Piquero and Benson (2004a) who noted the importance of how 
organizations play a role in “structuring” opportunities for potential offenders, but Cornish and Clarke 
(1987, p. 943) take this one step further, by also highlighting the choice-structuring properties of the 
individual:  
. . .the term “choice-structuring property” is a relational concept designed to provide an 
analytic tool for increasing an understanding of the interaction between person variables and 
arrays of behaviors – in the case of crime, to specify more closely offenders as well as the 
offenses they commit. 
The above insights from the LCP and RCP emphasize the complexity of the commission 
process and the close relationship between offender and offense. It is clear that a focus on behavior in 
the commission process is required. A continued focus on intention, without an appreciation of how 
an offence is chosen, will perpetuate a myopic understanding of the problem. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this manuscript, we challenge the existing body of research in criminal organizational (ICA), which 
we assert has too narrowly focused on factors that influence either ICA intentions or actual behavior 
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during the commission process. The key opportunity is that this literature is missing is that ICA 
research has failed to correctly conceptualize, and subsequently measure or test, the decision-making 
processes involved in ICA. We demonstrate this deficiency by leveraging the RCP from criminology, 
which newly introduced the idea of an “initial involvement” stage, which encompasses those factors 
that lead an individual to consider participation in ICA. Importantly, RCP argues that if, during the 
initial involvement stage, an individual becomes motivated and decides that future ICA behavior is 
the most suitable course of action, then he or she will have reached a state of “readiness.” It is only 
after an individual has become readied, and at a later time, does the individual make event decisions 
in the perpetration of a specific crime. As the extant research has not considered the initial 
involvement stage, or the idea of “readiness,” we propose a revised version of the ESAC, which 
reflects these criminal decision-making stages. 
 Another contribution of our work is to further consider what exactly happens to people that 
would create motivations or needs that would lead to readiness. Again, the ICA is silent on these 
motivational triggers. Accordingly, we draw on the LCP. With a focus on time, context, and process, 
the LCP offers a framework in which are inscribed four key principles. Through the LCP, we can 
better understand why white collar crimes such ICA often occur later in one’s life. For example, it 
might require a key event such as financial strain during an ugly divorce, with a combination of one’s 
access to opportunities through their work position (e.g., system authorization that could allow for 
embezzlement) that provide motivation that leads to readiness. Through examples drawn from the 
LCP and white-collar crime literature, we illustrate how these principles can provide a basis for 
conceptualizing factors that motivate ICA and open up new avenues for future research/theory 
development. We conclude by providing an outline of exciting research opportunities based on the 
RCP and LCP.  
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR ICA LITERATURE  
Citation 
(Study type) 
Criminal/ malicious 
context? 
Participants DV type Other theories / 
constructs 
Method Findings / Application to DT 
D'Arcy and 
Devaraj 
(2012)  
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not strong 
criminal intent) 
Employees, 
including part-
time MBA 
students 
Scenarios 
(negative) 
Informal 
sanctions as DT 
extension 
Factorial 
survey 
Examined formal sanctions (combined severity/certainty) 
and added informal sanctions (social desirability and 
moral beliefs). All three were significant. All participants 
were given four scenarios and all measures were averaged 
from the four scenarios and analyzed together. 
D'Arcy and 
Hovav (2007)  
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not strong 
criminal intent) 
Employees, 
including part-
time MBA 
students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
n/a Factorial 
survey 
Did not directly use DT constructs, but argued that ISPs, 
SETA programs, monitoring, and preventive security 
software to be deterrence surrogates that reduce IS misuse 
intentions. All were significant except computer 
monitoring. 
D'Arcy and 
Hovav (2009)  
Partial (unauthorized 
access/modification 
intent) 
Employees, 
including part-
time MBA 
students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
Moral judgment Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Did not directly use DT constructs, but argued “security 
countermeasures” of ISPs, acceptable use guidelines, 
monitoring and SETA programs to be deterrence 
surrogates that reduce IS misuse intentions. Moral 
judgement was the strongest factors whereas mixed 
support was found for the deterrence surrogates 
D'Arcy et al. 
(2009a)  
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not strong 
criminal intent) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Moral 
commitment 
Factorial 
survey 
Showed that severity, but not certainty, was associated 
with decreased IS misuse intentions. Also, added moral 
commitment as a negative influencer. Other factors were 
also examined to predict certainty and severity. 4 
scenarios: (1) email joke, (2) use restricted info to ask for 
a raise, (3) unlicensed software, (4) round up work hours. 
All participants were given four scenarios and all 
measures were averaged from the four scenarios and 
analyzed together. 
Harrington 
(1996)  
Yes (ICA) IS employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Ethical judgments 
(denial of 
responsibility) 
Factorial 
survey 
This is not directly a DT study. However, they used 
corporate codes of ethics as deterrence surrogates in their 
study and used DT literature to justify this decision. 
Scenarios involved true criminal computer abuse: 
cracking, sabotage, purposeful virus spread, software theft, 
fraud. Showed corporate codes did not reduce intent, 
however they did serve to reduce denial of responsibility. 
Hovav and Partial (IS misuse Employees, Scenarios Moral beliefs Factorial Examined DT in US versus Korea context. All participants 
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Citation 
(Study type) 
Criminal/ malicious 
context? 
Participants DV type Other theories / 
constructs 
Method Findings / Application to DT 
D’Arcy 
(2012)  
intentions; not strong 
criminal intent) 
including part-
time MBA 
students 
(negative) survey were given four scenarios and all measures were averaged 
from the four scenarios and analyzed together. Examined 
severity and certainty. Certainty was significant for US 
sample but not severity; severity was significant for 
Korean sample but not certainty. 
Hu et al. 
(2011)  
Yes (ICA) Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
RCT, self-control, 
shame, moral 
beliefs 
Factorial 
survey 
Used certainty, severity, and celerity of sanctions. In 
model these three directly predicted informal and formal 
risks. Separate model showing these three against negative 
intentions showed no significance. Only extrinsic and 
intrinsic benefits were directly significant. Three computer 
abuse scenarios: unauthorized access for gain, steal/sell 
commercial secret, steal/sell product info.  
Lee et al. 
(2004a)  
Yes (ICA) Employees Intentions & 
behaviors 
(negative) 
Social control Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Did not use certainty and severity. Instead, used security 
policy, security awareness, and physical security system 
all as “general deterrence theory” surrogates. Examined 
intention from participants and then added reported actual 
abuse from insiders and outside “invaders.” Model 
deterrence surrogates as predictors of “self-defense 
intention”, which then was significant modelled to 
decrease abuse by “invaders” and abuse by insiders. Of the 
surrogates, only “security system” was significant. 
Lowry et al. 
(2014) 
Partial (some ICA 
but not all was 
criminal) 
Employees Behaviors 
(negative) 
Formalism vs. 
utilitarianism 
Collectivism 
versus 
individualism 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
The purpose of this article was to examine the degree to 
which ethics (formalisms versus utilitarianism) and culture 
(collectivism versus individualism) is associated with 
computer abuse. Those leaning toward formalistic ethics 
were less likely to commit computer abuse than those 
leaning toward utilitarianism. Collectivists were less likely 
to commit computer abuse than individualists.  
Lowry et al. 
(2015)  
Partial (some ICA 
but not all was 
criminal) 
Employees Behaviors 
(negative) 
Fairness theory Cross-
sectional 
survey 
The primary purpose of the article was testing fairness 
theory in the context of reactive computer abuse at work. 
However, the authors tested certainty, severity, and 
celerity as counter-explanations. They were not significant 
in this context. 
Peace et al. 
(2003)  
Yes (software 
piracy; form of ICA) 
Employees Attitudes & 
Intentions 
TPB Cross-
sectional 
Studied employee software piracy in the workplace. 
Severity and certainty decreased attitude. 
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Citation 
(Study type) 
Criminal/ malicious 
context? 
Participants DV type Other theories / 
constructs 
Method Findings / Application to DT 
survey 
Posey et al. 
(2011) 
Partial (some ICA 
but not all was 
criminal) 
Employees Behaviors 
(negative) 
Justice theory 
Reactance theory 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
The primary purpose of the article was justice theory and 
reactance theory in the context of reactive computer abuse 
at work. Both procedural and distributed justices were 
associated with increased computer abuse. 
Straub (1990)  Yes (ICA) IS management Manager 
report of 
observed 
abuse 
(negative) 
Provide basic 
rival explanations 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Implementing IS security deterrents (measured as certainty 
and severity) decreased computer abuse. Straub (1986) is 
the dissertation version of this article and has the same 
data; thus we summarize them together here. 
Straub and 
Welke (1998)  
Yes (ICA) IS management Qualitative 
discussion of 
risk 
assessment 
n/a Qual. Non-empirical qualitative study that used ideas of DT to 
help cope with and plan for systems risk. Not a direct test 
of DT, but suggested communicating sanctions as part of 
SETA programs. 
Willison et al. 
(2016) 
Yes (ICA) Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
DT 
Neutralization 
theory 
Justice theory 
Factorial 
survey 
Using scenarios, showed employees may form intentions 
toward computer abuse if they perceive procedural justice, 
but that this is moderated by neutralization and certainty of 
sanctions. 
 
 
                                                     
i To clarify, CERT is not an acronym; it is a name and a registered service mark. "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered service marks of Carnegie 
Mellon University. See http://www.cert.org/  
ii Willison and Warkentin (2013) stated their Figure 3 p. 5 was adapted from Loch et al. (1992) 
